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PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING 
The parties to this proceeding are: 
Martin I. Broberg - Plaintiff, appellant 
Tim Hess - Defendant, respondent 
Karen Hess - Defendant, respondent 
-iii-
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution and Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(i) (1953) provide the Utah Supreme Court 
jurisdiction over this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did plaintiff preserve any issue for appeal? 
2. Did the trial court's jury voir dire constitute a 
clear abuse of discretion? 
3. If so, was plaintiff unduly prejudiced thereby? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Defendants-respondents Hess ("defendants") object to 
plaintiff-appellant Broberg's ("plaintiff") statement of the facts 
in that although the trial below arose out of plaintiff's alleged 
slip and fall at the basement apartment, rented by plaintiff from 
defendants, the jury did not find as fact how plaintiff actually 
injured himself and this matter was disputed at trial. 
2. The jury specifically found in the special verdict 
that no act on the part of defendants caused plaintiff's alleged 
injury. (R. 226) 
3. Plaintiff's counsel never objected to the actual 
jury voir dire conducted by the court. (Transcript, pp. 2-20) 
4. Plaintiff's counsel was specifically given the 
opportunity to submit further questions at the end of the trial 
court's voir dire but failed to request any further questions once 
he was made aware of the extent to which the trial court initially 
intended to voir dire the jury. (Transcript, p. 19) 
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5. Plaintiffs1 counsel passed the jury for cause with-
out any objection. (Transcript, pp. 19-20) 
6. During voir dire, the court specifically asked 
prospective jurors to state their own employment, their prior 
employment if retired, their spouse's employment or their spouse's 
prior employment if retired. (Transcript, p. 3) 
7. The court asked prospective jurors if they were 
acquainted with any of the parties. (Transcript, pp. 7-9) 
8. The trial court asked prospective jurors if they 
were acquainted with any counsel or their respective law firms. 
(Transcript, pp. 10-11) 
9. The trial court asked prospective jurors whether or 
not they were landlords (Transcript, p. 11); whether or not they 
or their immediate families were tenants or involved in disputes 
with landlords (Transcript, pp. 13-14); if any prospective juror 
worked for an attorney (Transcript, p. 15); if any prospective 
juror had a bias toward either party for having hired an attorney 
(Transcript, p. 17); if any prospective juror had any problem with 
applying the law as instructed by the judge (Transcript, p. 19); 
or if there was any reason whatsoever that any prospective juror 
could not try the case impartially (Transcript, pp. 14-15). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is undisputed that plaintiff did not timely object to 
any questions given or omitted by the trial court during jury 
voir dire. He declined to ask the court for further questioning 
at the close of the court's intended voir dire when the court 
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asked him specifically for any additional questions. He passed 
the jury for cause without objection. Having failed to raise such 
objections at the appropriate time and having failed to put any 
such objections in the record, such objections were waived and 
cannot now be raised on appeal. Plaintiff has not shown that the 
trial court abused its discretion nor that any such alleged abuse 
resulted in undue prejudice. The Utah Supreme Court's holding in 
Saltas v. Affleck, 105 P.2d 176 (Utah 1940), rendered subsequent 
to Balle v. Smith, specifically held that it was reversible error 
for prospective jurors to be interrogated as to their interest in 
a spefically named insurance company or even generally so as to 
indicate that an insurance company was the real party in interest. 
Injection of insurance into this case would have been reversible 
error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF'S VOIR DIRE OBJECTION IS WAIVED 
FOR FAILURE TO OBJECT AT TRIAL. 
As noted on page 6 of Appellant's Brief, it was not until 
after the jury returned a verdict against plaintiff and in favor 
of defendant that plaintiff, in a motion for new trial, claimed 
any error involving jury voir dire. 
In King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987), an appeal 
was taken alleging error on two grounds. First, appellant therein 
claimed that the trial court's failure to give particular jury 
instructions warranted new trial. Second, appellant therein 
claimed that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to 
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ask jury voir dire to determine any juror's connection to 
defendant's insurance company. The court rejected appellant's 
first argument on the basis that appellant had failed to object at 
trial. In this regard, the court stated: 
The party claiming an error in the proceedings 
also bears the responsibility of assuring that 
"the record adequately preserves objection or 
argument for review in the event of an appeal." 
Barson, 682 P.2d at 837 (citation omitted). 
Id. at p. 621. 
As the Utah Supreme Court pointed out in Condas v. Condas, 
618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980) : 
Defects curable at trial cannot be relied upon 
by a party if the trial court has had no 
opportunity to rule thereon. See, Drugger v. 
Cox, Utah, 564 P.2d 303 (1977). id. at p. 495. 
In like manner, the Utah Supreme Court "will not review alleged 
error when no objection at all is made at the trial level." State 
v. Leslie, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983); Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 
778 (Utah 1986) . 
Plaintiff made no objection to the voir dire asked by the 
trial court. The trial court specifically asked counsel for 
plaintiff if the jury was passed for cause and plaintiff's counsel 
made no objection. (Transcript, p. 19, line 22 through p. 20, 
line 7) Particularly instructive on this point is the case of 
Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1984). In that case, 
appellants claimed error as to the manner of jury voir dire. The 
Supreme Court of Wyoming stated: 
Furthermore, the appellant has not made any 
showing by brief or argument with respect to 
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prejudice arising out of any inhibition of 
his exercise of preemptory challenges. The 
record is silent as to whether or in what 
manner the appellant exercised his preemptory 
challenges. His argument is not that he was 
denied his right with respect to the use of 
preemptory challenges, but simply that he 
could in some way have better utilized his 
challenges if the trial court had not 
exercised its discretion with respect to the 
conduct of voir dire in the manner in which 
it did. There is no error to be found in 
this claim. The appellant was entitled to a 
fair and impartial jury, not one which he 
perceived to be sympathetic. In this regard 
we note that the following matter does appear 
in the record on appeal: 
The Court: Are the parties satisfied 
that a jury of 12, plus 2 alternates, 
has been drawn and qualified in this 
matter? Mr. Carroll? 
Mr. Carroll: The state is satisfied, 
Your Honor. 
The Court: And, Mr. Barnett? 
Mr. Barnett: Defense is satisfied, 
Your Honor. 
Id. at pp. 1000, 1003. 
Just as in Jahnke, plaintiff made no objections to the 
questions actually asked by the court during voir dire, neither 
did plaintiff object to the jury actually impaneled. 
The requirement that appellants object on the record to 
preserve an issue for appeal is well founded. The establishment 
of a record indicates both the objection and sets forth the 
grounds thereof. It alerts the trial court to the basis for the 
objection, thus enabling the trial court to consider the merits of 
the objection at the time it is raised in order to cure, if 
necessary, any defect, thus allowing the case to proceed in a 
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judicially efficient manner. 
Plaintiff could have submitted to the court his proposed 
jury voir dire prior to the morning of trial and had the court 
rule prior to the day of trial. Such procedure would have allowed 
plaintiff to put any objections on the record at that time. He 
didnft. Plaintiff had the opportunity to object at the time of 
jury voir dire to the adequacy of questions actually asked. He 
didn't. The trial court specifically solicited further questions 
from plaintiff's counsel. No further questions were requested by 
plaintiff. Plaintiff's counsel was asked if he passed the jury 
for cause. This he did. Having failed to object at the time of 
jury voir dire, plaintiff cannot now raise this point on appeal. 
In Higgins v. Hermes, 89 N.M. 379, 552 P.2d 1227 (1976), 
a defendant appealed a personal injury action claiming that 
plaintiff's extensive jury voir dire was prejudicial. 
The defendant contends that reversible error 
was committed when the plaintiff's counsel 
intensively questioned a potential juror on 
voir dire about her employment with an insurance 
company and about her investments in insurance 
companies. The defendant argues that the 
questioning was overly lengthy and thus 
prejudicial to the defendant. No objection 
was made during the course of this testimony 
and therefore error was not preserved. State 
v. James, 76 N.M. 376, 415 P.2d 350 (1966); 
State v. Harris, 41 N.M. 426, 70 P.2d 757 
(1937); Candelaria v. Gutierrez, 30 N.M. 195, 
230 P. 436 (1924). [Emphasis added.] 
Id. at p. 1228. 
Cruz v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 707 P.2d 360 (Colo. App. 
1985), is also helpful. In Cruz, the court stated: 
Plaintiff argues that, had the motion been 
granted, certain allegedly improper questions 
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asked prospective jurors on voir dire or 
directed to plaintiff on cross-examination 
and some allegedly improper remarks in closing 
argument would have been prohibited. However, 
plaintiff's counsel did not object at the time 
any of these questions were asked or remarks 
were made. Therefore, errors, if any, were 
waived. Christensen v. Hoover, 643 P.2d 525 
(Colo. 1982); Spears Free Clinic and Hospital 
for Poor Children v. Maier, 128 Colo. 263, 
261 P.2d 489 (1953). [Emphasis added.] 
Id. at 362. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION AS TO JURY VOIR DIRE. 
As acknowledged by plaintiff on page 10 of his 
Appellant's Brief, "matters of possible bias and prejudice on the 
part of the jury are within the discretion of the trial court." 
King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d at 622 (Utah 1987). It has long been 
noted that the trial judge has considerable discretion as to the 
manner and form in which he will conduct voir dire examination to 
determine the qualifications of jurors. Utah State Road Comm'n v. 
Marriott, 21 Ut.2d 238, 444 P.2d 57 (1968). In fact, matters of 
possible bias on the part of the jury and the trial court's ruling 
on whether to question prospective jurors with respect to such 
possible bias "will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is 
demonstrated that the court abused its discretion." Maltby v. Cox 
Constr. Co. Inc., 598 P.2d 336 (Utah 1979). Thus, it is clear 
plaintiff must first show that the trial court abused its 
discretion. He has not. 
Plaintiff's reading of King v. Fereday, supra, on page 11 
of his appellant's brief is inaccurate. Plaintiff asserts that: 
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The lower court's denial [in King v. Fereday] 
of the requested questions was upheld by this 
court only because the trial judge agreed to 
ask if any juror had "stock ownership in a 
business and, if so, the nature of the business." 
Plaintiff neglects to note the questions actually asked in this 
case by the trial court, including the questions inquiring into 
the present or past employers of jurors and their spouses. 
In King v. Fereday plaintiff therein asserted as error 
the trial judge's refusal during jury voir dire to inquire about 
the prospective jurors' connection to defendant's insurance 
carrier. After quoting Maltby v. Cox Constr. Co., supra, to the 
effect that such matters were within the sound discretion of the 
trial court and would not be disturbed on appeal unless 
demonstrated to be an abuse of discretion, the Utah Supreme Court, 
affirming, noted that plaintiff had failed to so demonstrate such 
abuse. The Supreme Court did not say it was upholding the trial 
court's discretion "only because the trial judge agreed to ask if 
any juror had stock ownership in a business . . .."In fact, the 
Court stated: 
We also note that trial judges typically ask 
jurors about their occupations. These 
questions were sufficient to bring to light 
any connection a prospective juror might have 
had with defendant's insurance carrier. 
Second, plaintiff failed to include in the 
record the questions actually asked during 
the jury voir dire. As a result, a deter-
mination that the trial court abused its 
discretion in its voir dire of the jury 
would require speculation on our part. 
Id. at 623. 
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The trial court in this case asked each prospective 
juror about their own employment, their past employment if they 
were retired, their spouse's employment if they were married, 
and their spouse's prior employment if the spouse was retired. 
(Transcript at p. 3) In addition, the court asked if any of 
the jurors were acquainted with any of the parties (Transcript, 
pp. 7-9); if any of the jurors were acquainted with counsel or 
their respective law firms (Transcript, pp. 10-11); if any of 
the prospective jurors were landlords (Transcript, p. 11); if 
any of the jurors or their immediate families were tenants or 
involved in disputes with landlords (Transcript, pp. 13-14); if 
any prospective juror worked for an attorney (Transcript, p. 
15); if any juror had a bias toward either party having hired 
an attorney (Transcript, p. 17); if any prospective juror had 
any problem with applying the law as instructed by the judge 
(Transcript, p. 19); if there was any reason whatsoever the 
prospective jurors could not try the case impartially 
(Transcript, pp. 14-15); or if any juror had read or heard 
articles calling for tort reform (Transcript, p. 17). 
At the end of voir dire, the court specifically solicited 
further questions from plaintiff's counsel but no further requests 
were made. (Transcript p. 19, lines 19-21) In fact, while at the 
bench and while off the record, plaintiff's counsel fully 
acquiesced to the trial court's decision regarding the very ques-
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tions at issue here. This fact points out the necessity of put-
ting objections on the record. 
From a review of the record, it is absolutely clear that 
the trial court in no way abused its discretion in the course of 
jury voir dire. 
In addition to showing an abuse of disgression, 
plaintiff, from the record, must also show prejudice arising from 
the abuse. In Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1984), the 
court stated: 
Furthermore, the party contesting the 
rulings of the trial court with respect 
to the scope and content of voir dire 
examination of jurors is obligated to 
establish not only an abuse of the trial 
court's proper discretion, but he must 
demonstrate the substantial prejudice to 
his rights as a result of that abuse of 
discretion. United States v. Robinson, 
154 U.S. App. D.C. 265, 475 F.2d 376 
(1973). See also, Hopkinson v. State, 
[632 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1981) ]; 
* * * 
Furthermore, the appellant has not made 
any showing by brief or argument with 
respect to prejudice arising out of any 
inhibition of his exercise of preemptory 
challenges. The record is silent as to 
whether or in what manner the appellant 
exercised his preemptory challenges. His 
argument is not that he was denied his 
right with respect to the use of pre-
emptory challenges, but simply that he 
could in some way have better utilized 
his challenges if the trial court had not 
exercised its discretion with respect to the 
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conduct of voir dire in the manner in which 
it did. There is no error to be found in 
this claim. The appellant was entitled to a 
fair and impartial jury, not one which he 
perceived to be sympathetic. [Emphasis added.] 
Id. at p. 1003. 
When the record of the trial court's actual voir dire is 
reviewed, there can be no question: (1) That the court did not 
abuse its discretion as to what questions it chose to ask; (2) that 
absolutely no prejudice resulted to plaintiff as a result of the 
questions actually asked; (3) that plaintiff completely acquiesced 
in the questions actually asked by the court; and (4) that at the 
end of jury voir dire, plaintiff declined to request any further 
questioning of the jury. 
Additionally, plaintiff's whole basis on appeal does not 
stand scrutiny. Plaintiff's position is that he has in some way 
been prejudiced because he was unable to find out which jury 
members had worked for an insurance company or owned an interest 
in State Farm Insurance Company. Neither of these possibilities 
has been established by plaintiff in the record. In fact, on the 
record, no impaneled juror worked for an insurance company. 
Prior to trial, the trial court granted Hess' Motion in 
Limine that there would be no mention of insurance during the 
trial. Plaintiff agreed with this motion. (R. 94) 
At the outset then, no jury member was going to hear any 
evidence or any mention of any insurance company whatsoever, much 
less State Farm. Therefore, it is absolutely clear that even if 
one of the jury members had owned an interest in State Farm or had 
worked for an insurance company some time in the past, such would 
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never be relevant to his consideration of the case since no jury 
member would know (1) whether or not either plaintiff or 
defendant was insured nor (2) that out of thousands of insurance 
companies, defendant was insured by State Farm. Plaintiff cannot 
claim any prejudice under these circumstances. 
When one considers plaintiff's position in light of the 
simplest of analysis, it becomes clear that plaintiff!s only 
interest in asking jury members whether or not they had worked for 
an insurance company or whether or not they had a financial interest 
in State Farm was to educate the jury that in fact Hess was 
insured by State Farm. This is clearly contrary to well settled 
Utah law. 
POINT III. 
UTAH LAW FORBIDS THE INJECTION OF INSURANCE 
INTO A NEGLIGENCE CASE SUCH AS THIS. 
Plaintiff's brief relies almost entirely for Utah law on 
Balle v. Smith, 17 P.2d 224 (Utah 1932). That 1932 case was an 
action for personal injuries arising out of an automobile 
accident. In that case the court did state that a plaintiff was 
entitled to learn whether or not a juror was interested in or con-
nected with an insurance company, but the court did not state 
under what circumstances such disclosure was warranted. The court 
did state: 
The universal rule is that it is irrelevant 
to the issue of negligence whether the 
defendant is carrying liability insurance or 
not, and, subject to some qualifications which 
need not be here mentioned, such testimony is 
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wholly inadmissible- Courts have guarded 
jealously against the introduction of such 
evidence before the jury, not only because it 
is irrelevant to the issues, but because jurors 
are commonly thought to be prejudiced against 
insurance companies, and, if the fact were 
known that the defendant is insured, jurors 
would be less inclined to consider the case 
on the merits, and more inclined to render a 
verdict for plaintiff and in a larger amount 
than if the defendant, especially where the 
defendant is an individual, had to bear the 
loss alone- We do not say this suspicion is 
well founded, but merely that such prejudice 
is widely believed to exist. For the same 
reasons arguments and statements of counsel 
directly stating, or from which it may be 
inferred, that the defendant is insured, are 
forbidden. In many cases courts declare a 
mistrial, or on appeal a reversal, where 
counsel have abused their privilege by 
improperly forcing the fact that defendant 
is protected by indemnity insurance to the 
attention of the jury. 1(3. at 229. 
Not cited in Broberg's Appellant's Brief is the case of 
Saltas v. Affleck, 105 P.2d 176 (Utah 1940), where, after 
discussing at length the prior case of Balle v. Smith, supra, the 
court held exactly contrary to Balle stating: 
Within the rule of the cases it is prejudicial 
error for counsel to ask each of the jurors 
if he were an officer or stockholder of the 
Northwest Casualty Company of Seattle, Washington 
[the defendants1 insurer]. The same ethical 
standards should be maintained in the questioning 
of jurors as of witnesses. 
The case of Alexiou v. Nockas, 171 Wash. 369, 
17 P.2d 911, 914, is direct authority that the 
examination of each juror, as was done in the 
instant case as to his insurance connection 
was prejudicial error. The court said: "The 
examination of the jurors by respondent's 
counsel constituted reversible error. We 
cannot countenance such inappreciation of the 
ethics as counsel manifested. The purpose of 
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his questions was, patently, to inform the 
jury that the loss would fall upon an insurance 
company instead of the appellant." 
We are of the opinion it was reversible error 
for counsel to interrogate each juror as to 
whether he were a stockholder in a specifically 
named insurance company or generally so as to 
indicate that an insurance company was the 
probable real party in interest, a matter 
foreign to the issues in the case, when no 
preliminary questions had been asked. 
Id. at p. 179. [Emphasis added.] 
None of the prospective jurors in the instant case 
indicated any affiliation whatsoever with an insurance company 
during the jury voir dire. The court asked each juror to identify 
their own employer, their prior employer if they were retired, 
their spouse's employer, and their spouse's former employer if 
retired. The record indicates that such questioning satisfied 
plaintiff's interests in this regard. If not, counsel should have 
objected, giving the grounds for the objection. He should have at 
least requested further questioning such as ownership in a 
business when asked by the court for any such further questions. 
This he did not do. 
In Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 U.2d 261, 409 P.2d 121 (Utah 
1965), the court stated: 
We do not depart from our former position: 
that the question of insurance is immaterial 
and should not be injected into the trial; 
and that it is the duty of both counsel and 
the court to guard against it. Id. at p. 123. 
In Hill v. Cloward, 14 Ut.2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962), the 
court, subsequent to Balle and Saltas, noted both the impropriety 
of injecting insurance into the case and the requirement to object 
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timely to preserve appeal: 
It seems hardly necessary to state that the 
matter of insurance is quite immaterial to 
issues as to liability and damages, or the 
amount thereof. It is also true that inasmuch 
as the defendant is entitled to have this 
extraneous matter excluded from the case, 
the plaintiff is entitled to the same protec-
tion if he so desires. . . . In the instant 
situation candor requires recognition that 
it was improper for the defendant to inject 
the matter of insurance into the case. 
But there is an insuperable difficulty with 
the plaintiff's position. His counsel let 
the incident pass without objection and 
without a request to rectify any harm he 
thought had been done. Fair play and good 
conscience require that he do so at the 
earliest opportunity. It would be manifestly 
unjust to permit a party to sit silently by, 
believing that prejudicial error had been 
committed, proceed with the trial to its 
completion, and allow the jury to deliberate 
and reach a verdict, to see if it wins, then 
if he loses, come forward with a claim that 
such an error rendered the verdict a nullity. 
If this could be done, proceedings after such 
an occurrence would be in vain and thus an 
imposition upon the court, the jury and all 
concerned. The court will not countenance 
any such mockery of its proceedings. If 
something occurs which the party thinks is 
wrong and so prejudicial to him that he 
thereafter cannot have a fair trial, he 
must make his objection promptly and seek 
redress by moving for a mistrial, or by 
having cautionary instructions given, if that 
is deemed adequate, or be held to waive what-
ever right may have existed to do so. 
Id. at pp. 187-188. [Emphasis added.] 
In Ivie v. Richardson, 9 U.2d 5, 336 P.2d 781 (1959), the 
court stated: 
There are additional circumstances in the 
instant case that are indicative of the fact 
that a fair trial was not had by the defendant. 
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Counsel for the plaintiff appears to have tried 
quite overtly to get before the jury the idea 
that the defendant was covered by insurance. 
Defendant's attorney found it necessary in 
cross-examining plaintiff to use a statement 
taken from her some time after the accident. 
Although counsel were well aware that this man 
was an insurance company investigator, plaintiff's 
counsel persisted in inquiring about identification 
of this man in the presence of the jury. Inquiry 
as to who the man was was quite proper, but 
inquiry as to his connections and purpose 
obviously lent itself to the thinly veiled 
ulterior design of getting the fact of insurance 
before the jury. There seems to be no question 
about the impression it made. Id. at pp. 786-787. 
As explained at the end of Point II of this brief, 
plaintiff's only possible purpose in requesting questions 
regarding insurance was to get the inference of insurance before 
the jury. There was no possibility of bias resulting from an 
undisclosed presence of insurance. No juror worked for an 
insurance company and no impaneled juror knew the parties. No 
evidence was anticipated regarding insurance. Only if the jury 
was to be made aware that the defendants were insured, and insured 
by State Farm, could there be any possibility of bias. This did 
not occur. 
Finally, it has long been Utah law that: 
The safeguarding against disclosure to a jury 
of insurance coverage in personal injury trials 
is a very touchy subject which lawyers and 
judges have always been obliged to handle with 
such caution as to justify use of the metaphore 
"walking on eggs." The understanding has always 
been that it was prejudicial error to deliberately 
inject insurance into such a trial. 
* * * 
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We do not depart from our former position: that 
the question of insurance is immaterial and 
should not be injected into the trial; and that 
is the duty of both counsel and the court to 
guard against it* Young v. Barney, 20 Ut.2d 108, 
433 P.2d at 848-849 (1967). [Emphasis added.] 
It should be noted that the Utah Supreme Court in Young 
emphasized this point in footnote, stating: 
The writer recalls as pertinent here the wry 
comment of a much respected former member of 
this court in a comparable situation: "We 
could not make it any more definite unless we 
said damn it". [Emphasis added.] ^d. at p. 849. 
That such injection of insurance would be reversible error, see 
also, Gittens v. Lundberg, 3 Ut.2d 392, 284 P.2d 1115, 1118 (1955). 
Clearly, it was well within the discretion of the trial 
court not to ask members of the jury about their connection with 
an insurance company in light of the fact that no issue in the 
case was to turn on insurance. Furthermore, the court's actual 
questioning about the juror's employment as well as their spouse's 
employment was sufficient to meet plaintiff's needs and within the 
discretion of the trial court. Finally, as the court noted in 
King v. Fereday, supra, plaintiff's counsel having failed to 
object at the time of trial waived any objection here. 
CONCLUSION 
It is undisputed, long standing Utah law that plaintiff 
cannot raise as a point on appeal an objection not raised at 
trial. Plaintiff's counsel had every opportunity to object and to 
put such objections on the record. This he did not do. He 
further failed to request any further questions which did not 
reach issues not covered in the jury voir dire when such further 
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questions were solicited by the trial court. He further passed 
the jury for cause without any objection and in fact made no 
protest whatsoever until after the jury returned a verdict against 
him. 
The conduct of jury voir dire has long been within the 
discretion of the trial court. Without clearly showing that the 
trial court abused its discretion and that such abuse was 
prejudicial to plaintiff, no appeal is well taken even if it had 
been properly preserved. 
Notwithstanding the absence of plaintiff's objection at 
trial, the opportunity plaintiff had to have further questions 
submitted to the jury, and plaintiff's passing the jury for cause, 
the trial court's ruling, was not only within the court's 
discretion, but was required under Utah law. The court's holding 
in Saltas v. Affleck, subsequent to Balle v. Smith, as well as 
long standing Utah law state unequivocably that it is reversible 
error to inject insurance coverage into a negligent action such as 
this. The sole motivation for plaintiff's requested voir dire 
questions at issue in this case was to inform the jury of the 
presence of insurance. This was clearly inappropriate. 
For the above-stated reasons, it is clear that the trial 
court's actions should be affirmed in every respect. 
DATED this Y day of December, 1987. 
STRONG & HANNI 
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